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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines data from the National Election Studies in order to assess the
significant determinants of the political behavior of Catholics in the American electorate. A
complex array of variables including religious commitment, generational differences,
social status, and policy attitudes account for limited change in partisan alignment among
American Catholics. The analyses expose the long-term, durable nature of partisan attachment,
as older generation Catholics who register as actively committed to their religion also remain
committed Democrats. Therefore, older Catholics have not been part of the broader ideological
realignment which has taken place among other religious adherents, namely evangelical and
mainline Protestants.
Younger Catholics are significantly more apt to become Republican in their partisan
identification than were their parents. Comparing the effects of an array of policy attitudes and
socio-demographic variables between Catholic and Protestants illuminates the differences and
similarities among these religious groups. What emerges is a consistent pattern demonstrating
an ideological realignment within the American electorate. This research adds to the ideological
realignment thesis by showing how religious commitment is the driving force behind this
realignment. In addition, this thesis presents evidence illustrating that younger Catholics and
committed Catholics will continue to move toward Republican partisan identification and that
the traditional allegiance of Catholic voters to the Democratic party will continue to decline.
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To Mel Gibson; may his passion for Our Lord’s Passion also become our passion.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There has developed, according to David Leege, “a veritable cottage industry of scholars
who have studied religion and politics among American Catholics, but a single theory that
explains the dynamics of Catholic political behavior has eluded their grasp” (Dionne 2000).
Developing a single theory for explaining the electoral behavior of any group is a rather
complicated endeavor. However, as religion and religiosity continue to gain prominence in
politics and political science, it is essential that scholars of realignment, partisanship, and
political behavior continue to advance our understanding of the dynamics of the Catholic voter.
Consider that since 1980, according to American National Election Survey (NES) data, 28
percent of the electorate has identified itself as Roman Catholic. Evangelical and mainline
Protestants have self-identified, during the same time-frame, as 32 and 29 percent of the
electorate respectively. Geographic concentration of Catholic identifiers serves to enhance the
electoral importance of Catholic voters in presidential politics, as key states including Ohio, New
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico all contain
large pluralities of Catholic voters (Mockabee 2004; Wagner 1998).
In addition, Catholic religious affiliation constitutes the largest plurality among elected
members of the United States Congress. For example, in the 107th U.S. Congress, 150 of the 535
members registered their religious affiliation as Catholic, with Baptist affiliation in a distant
second place with 72 adherents. Catholic affiliation has been dominant among members of
Congress since 1964, and the expectation is that this trend will continue for the foreseeable
future. The significance of the Catholic vote is also enhanced by its distinction as a crucial
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“swing vote” in presidential elections (Wagner 1998; Wald 1997). For example, in 1980 and
1984, Catholic voters supported the Republican presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, as did
their Protestant counterparts. Evangelical and mainline Protestants have continued to consistently
support Republican presidential candidates, even in the 1992 and 1996 elections, when the
significant third party candidacy of H. Ross Perot also appeared on the ballot (Kellstedt 1993).
Catholics, on the other hand, have behaved quite differently. In 1988, the Catholic vote for the
Republican nominee, Vice President George H.W. Bush, fell dramatically as Catholics split their
support between the two major party candidates. This is peculiar considering that the Republican
party, in 1984, registered receiving its largest percentage of the Catholic vote in American
history (Wagner 1998). In 1992, 49 percent of Catholics voted for the Democratic presidential
nominee, Bill Clinton, who received 43 percent of the national popular vote. In 1996, 53 percent
of Catholic voters again chose the Democratic candidate, while 38 percent voted for the
Republican contender Robert Dole. In the 2000 presidential election, Catholic voters were once
again evenly split in their support for the two major party candidates (Mockabee 2004). These
factors warrant and compel the pursuit of a more vivid explanation of Catholic political behavior
within the American electorate.
The prominence of Catholics in American politics is clear. What then, has made
discernment of the dynamics of the Catholic vote so elusive to scholars of religion and politics?
The answer to this seems to lie in the puzzle of Catholic partisanship when compared to the
partisan affiliation of other religious adherents. Evangelical and mainline Protestant groups, in
every geographic region, have moved toward the Republican party, particularly since the election
of 1980 (Carmines and Stanley 1992; Kellstedt 1993; Layman 1997; Wald 1997). As Campbell
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has noted, with the exceptions of blacks and Jews, the “proposition holds that—generally
speaking—religious dedication corresponds with Republican Party ID” (p.217, 2002). This
general pattern, however, has not emerged among Catholic voters, despite a plurality selfidentifying as conservative on the three-point ideological scale (Kellstedt 1993).
To further illustrate the dissimilarity of Catholic partisanship, consider NES data from the
1992 election. NES survey data reports that 44 percent of evangelical and mainline Protestants
are self-described as ideologically conservative, while at the same time 35 and 37 percent report
identifying as Republicans, with 30 and 27 percent reporting that they are registered as
Democrats. Among Catholics, 41 percent are self-described as ideologically conservative;
however, only 20 percent report being affiliated with the Republican party, while 41 percent
claim to be Democrats (Kellstedt 1993). Although there has been a dramatic movement of
Protestant adherents toward the Republican party, Catholic voters seem to be rather resistant to
the ongoing realignment which has taken place among other religious groups. Perhaps New Deal
allegiances have remained durable among voters who self-identify as Catholic; however,
scholars have expected a more vigorous partisan shift among Catholics (Prendergast 1999).
Based upon the evidence presented, Catholic ideological identification, partisanship, and
presidential vote choice do not demonstrate the kind of congruity which has been illustrated by
the other prominent groups of Christian identifiers: evangelical and mainline Protestants.
Explaining the counterintuitive nature of Catholic partisanship will then be a primary focus of
this thesis. As the ideological and religious divide continues to expand, committed Protestant
voters are continuing to move toward the Republican party (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Layman and Carmines 1997; Layman 1997). Therefore, as religious denominationalism has
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declined, a much more brisk and vigorous movement of Catholic identifiers in the same direction
has been expected. Catholic movement toward the Republican party, however, has been quite
modest. Comparing the policy differences among these groups, as well as the effect of sociodemographic variables between and among Catholic and Protestant voters, should begin to
expand our understanding of religiosity and partisanship among religious identifiers, particularly
Catholics, in the American electorate.

Synopsis
The introductory portion of this work outlines some general principles regarding
the importance of the “Catholic vote,” the puzzle of Catholic partisanship, and the elements of
this constituency which have remained elusive to researchers of religion and politics in the
American electorate.
Chapter 2 establishes some of the important concepts related to political behavior in
general and to the behavior of religious sub-groups, most notably Catholic voters, in particular.
These concepts include the salience of religion and its effect upon electoral behavior, ideological
realignment, enhanced party polarization, and religion as the basis of cultural conflict and
societal cleaving. The second chapter also reviews the established literature on the subject of the
religious factor in American politics. The review will include an examination of the recognized
strategies for measurement of religious commitment and its effects upon party identification.
Chapter 3 will establish the data and methods to be used to conduct an empirical analysis
of religiosity and how it affects Catholic voters. Several hypotheses regarding Catholic political
behavior will be posited, and a research model for testing these hypotheses will be introduced.
4

Both socio-demographic variables and policy attitudes between and among Catholic and
Protestant voters will be compared and contrasted in order to illuminate possible social status and
policy differences which may account for the variance in partisanship among these groups of
religious identifiers. Socio-demographic variables include gender, income, ideology, union
households, and age cohorts.
Chapter 4 will detail and explain the results of the empirical analysis pursued in the
previous chapter. The goal is to provide a greater understanding of the dynamics of the Catholic
voter. Chapter 5 will be the concluding chapter, in which a review of the previously enumerated
concepts and the evidence amassed will be outlined and summarized.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Salience of Religion in American Politics

The study of religion in politics is justified for numerous reasons. Firstly, most American
adults—between three-fifths and three-fourths—are willing to utilize a religious designation such
as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or other (Leege 1993). More Americans report belonging to
religious communities than to any other voluntary organization including unions, lodges, or
professional associations. Religion has always played a significant role in American life, and
contemporary events demonstrate that religion continues to shape our political life as well. This
is evidenced by the 1996 National Election Survey in which 45 percent of conservative
Republican voters in the southern United States identified as being part of the religious right
movement, displaying how mightily religious voters have contributed to Republican realignment
and subsequent electoral success in the South (Black and Black 2002).
When compared to other industrialized nations, research data confirms a high level of
religiosity among the American people. Americans consistently report that they are more likely
to believe in God, attend church services regularly, and testify that religion is salient in their
daily lives than citizens in other Western democracies such as Great Britain or Germany. Seymor
Lipset has reported that
One comparative survey shows 94 percent of Americans expressing faith in God,
as compared with 70 percent of Britons and 67 percent of West Germans. In
addition, 86 percent of Americans surveyed believe in heaven; 43 percent say
they attend church services weekly. The corresponding numbers of British respondents are 54 percent accepting the existence of heaven and only 14 percent
indicating they attend church weekly. For West Germans, the numbers are distinctly lower than for Americans, at 43 percent and 21 percent respectively . . .
And it should be noted that the historical evidence indicates that religious
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affiliation and belief in America are much higher in the twentieth century than in
the nineteenth, and have not decreased in the post-World War II era (Lipset 1996).

The comparative perspective confirms what observers have called American religious
exceptionalism. The practical consequence of this exceptionalism is that religious commitment in
the United States plays a much more dramatic role in politics and partisanship than in other
Western democracies which were born out of the Christian tradition.
Religion has not merely been a distinguished footnote in American life; Religion
also matters politically. Indeed, people engage in religious activities with more frequency and
duration than they do political activities (Kellstedt 1993). In fact, when studying group
identification that affects political behavior, political scientists have traditionally used four main
group categories: race and ethnicity, income levels, geographic region, and religious affiliation
(Shafer 1993). While all of these variables are important to the study of political attitudes and
behavior, it seems that religion has been an elusive, if not neglected, variable in explaining
electoral phenomena. This is peculiar considering the influence of religion upon the lives of
individual Americans. As Kellstedt has noted:
Religion matters, it seems, regardless of how it is conceptualized: whether in
terms of social group affiliation, religious group identification, ritualistic or
private devotional practices, doctrinal beliefs, salience, or religious worldviews. Despite multivariate controls, each of these variables has an independent
impact on political attitudes and behaviors. And this is the case even though the
measures are often methodologically flawed (1993).
Shafer states that churches have served as “intermediary organizations for
politics, that array of organizations which stand between the individual citizen and the
institutions of government” (1993). It seems rather intuitive; given the pervasive nature of
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religion in American life, religiosity should be a noteworthy force in influencing individual and
group political behavior.
When establishing the weight of religiosity upon political behavior, it is essential
to discuss the effect of economic factors upon voting given their predominance in the literature
on electoral behavior (Lewis-Beck 1986; Kellstedt 1993). Conclusive evidence has been
assembled demonstrating that religious commitment can rival economic considerations in
relation to vote choice and partisanship (Kellstedt 1993). Economic considerations, including
income and a prospective evaluation of economic performance, are matched against religious
commitment and affiliation. Interestingly, the religious measures surpass economic measures on
partisanship. On vote choice, religious variables challenge the economic variables as predictors
among all whites. In addition, among evangelicals, religious commitment is an even stronger
predictor for partisanship and vote choice (Kellstedt 1993). The evidence is rather robust with
regard to religiosity and religious commitment and its influence upon vote choice and
partisanship. The evidence does not suggest that religiosity should supplant economic
considerations as an explanatory variable. On the contrary, the data implies that religion can
serve as a complimentary variable for furthering our understanding of political behavior as
religious commitment can rival the effects of other potential predictors of partisanship.
The 2000 presidential election, in which the incumbent Vice President Al Gore was
defeated even when all economic measures predicted that the incumbent party would retain the
White House, demonstrates that people do not vote on “bread issues” alone. In other words,
“it’s not just the economy, stupid!” Indeed, additional explanatory variables such as religiosity
are required in order to provide an adequate explanation for this kind of electoral phenomenon.
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Religion as a Social Cleavage
One of the major developments in the study of religion and politics in recent
scholarship has been the rise of religious traditionalism as a societal cleavage base and the
diminishing role of religious denominationalism as a source of social division. Consider the
presidential election of 1960, in which 83% of Catholics voted for their co-religionist, John F.
Kennedy (Wagner 1998). By contrast, a majority of Protestant voters chose to cast their ballots for
Richard M. Nixon, the Republican candidate for president. By 1976, religious denominationalism
had lost much of its value as a force for political division (Layman 1997; Layman and Carmines
1997). Recent scholarship convincingly suggests that the old allegiance of denominationalism has
given way to a new cleaving of the electorate based upon ideology, as conservative religionists,
regardless of denomination, are aligning politically with the Republican party while liberal
religionists and secular identifiers are considerably more Democratic (Fowler and Hertzke 1995;
Layman 1997). This new cleavage sets committed believers against those who have adopted
liberal views on religion or have identified as secular, and it is becoming an ever increasingly
relevant factor in explaining partisanship in contemporary American politics (Layman 1997).
The conceptualization of a societal cleavage in politics has been utilized by
political scientists to describe enduring cultural conflicts within the electorate (Layman
and Carmines 1997; Manza and Brooks 1999). More than merely ideological tensions,
the concept of a social cleavage is something much more durable, culminating in shifting
political associations which have developed due to divisions within the construct of civil society
(Dalton 1988; Manza and Brooks 1999). The key distinction between basic social rifts and a
societal chasm is that the latter will have a long-term effect upon political behavior.
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When it comes to determining the social bases of partisanship and vote choice,
the literature has been dominated by societal factors other than religion or religiosity, namely,
class, gender, and race. Indeed, many scholars have noted that the central tendency of specific
racial or ethnic groups is to participate in politics as a monolithic voting bloc (Leege 2000;
Manza and Brooks 1999; Wald 1997). In addition to race, other socio-demographic
characteristics are considered to have a tremendous effect upon partisanship and vote choice, and
also serve as the social base of party support as well as an impetus for societal and political
cleavage. Economic class or social position has generally been considered to be the primary
force behind these divisions (Dalton 1988; Layman and Carmines 1997; Zuckerman 1975). A
person’s social status has been determined to be a significant variable in explaining an
individual’s partisanship and political beliefs. In addition, social factors also indicate what kind
of political cues an individual will receive (Dalton 1988). However, at least since 1980, social
class and economic cleavages have considerably diminished, as values-based cleavages have
replaced them as the dominant source of political division in the United States, as well as in
some Western European democracies (Dalton 1988; Carmines and Stanley 1992; Layman and
Carmines 1997).
This new fault line between religiously active and secular voters seems to be the basis for
the ideological realignment which has been occurring since the election of 1980 (Carmines and
Stanley 1992; Dionne and Diiulio 2000; Fowler and Hertzke 1995). The effect of orthodoxy
upon political behavior should be a significant increase in the tendency for doctrinal
conservatives to move in the direction of the Republican party. These new tensions between
those who register as highly religious and more secular individuals are the impetus for
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contemporary political divisions and the adjustment of party identification which has taken place
in the American electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman and Carmines 1997). This
latest cleavage is exemplified by diminishing denominational conflicts which were heavily
pronounced before 1980:
That split has been restructured across denominations today. Thus pious
Catholics in the 1970s and 1980s found themselves increasingly aligned
with conservative evangelicals on social and political issues. Both groups
opposed abortion, supported public expressions of faith, criticized secular
public schools, and decried the effects of the sexual revolution. Theological
and cultural differences remain between orthodox Catholics and evangelical
Protestants, to be sure, but politically they are forging increasing alliances . . .
In the same way, liberal Protestants find they often have more in common
with liberal Catholics, Jews, and secular elites than they do with conservatives
in their own denominations (Fowler and Hertzke 1995).
Scholarship thus suggests that this new religious divide between orthodox and liberal
religious adherents transcends gender, class, and even race, making the religious cleavage
a powerful explanatory factor in American politics (Fowler and Hertzke 1995; Wald 1997).
Other scholars, however, maintain that religious affiliation still has a potent
effect upon political behavior. More specifically, it has been posited that certain denominational differences are becoming more important over time, while others are diminishing. For
example, divisions among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews may be on the decline, while a chasm
among denominations within Protestantism may be growing (Layman 1997). A substantial
number of researchers who study religion and politics insist that denominational affiliation
continues to have a considerable influence upon political expression. Nevertheless, it remains to
be determined if the advent of this religious doctrinal cleavage is sufficient to explain the
complex puzzle of Catholic partisan identification. One fact is clear, however, from the rise of
this cleavage based upon religious traditionalism: Karl Marx and Max Weber’s insistence that
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modernization, industrialization, and urbanization would produce secularization, thus eliminating
the influence of religion in modern culture and politics has proved to be inaccurate. Instead,
religion’s influence upon our political system seems to be greater now than at any point in our
history (Craig 1996; Inglehart 1977; Kellstedt 1993; Fowler and Hertzke 1995; Wald 1997).

Realignment

The strength and durability of party identification is one of the axioms of political
science. Since the publication of V.O. Key’s “Theory of Critical Elections” (1955) and “Secular
Realignment and the Party System” (1959), as well as The American Voter (1960), partisanship
has been recognized as a “standing decision,” a psychological attachment to political parties
which has been confirmed to be extremely stable when compared to other political attitudes
(Abramson and Ostrom 1991; Fiorina, 1981; Miller and Shanks 1996). This stability means that
partisanship is a long-term factor in voting behavior and does not change due to short-term
influences like economic conditions, foreign policy situations, or candidate magnetism. The
practical implication of partisan durability is that it remains a potent force in determining
election outcomes. There have been instances, however, in American history, of major shifts in
partisan alliances. These adjustments can be abrupt, brought about expeditiously by colossal
political events. The elections which begin these processes of party adjustment are called critical
elections, as they are forerunners of significant partisan change (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Kamieniecki 1985; Key 1955). Other shifts in party coalitions can also happen gradually over
time, as Key argued in his theory on secular partisan change (Key 1959; Petrocik 1987). This
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significant and enduring partisan change is what political scientists refer to as realignment. One
of the defining characteristics of realignment is the shift in allegiance of the group bases of party
coalitions, resulting in an increase in the relative size of a political party’s vote share (Dalton
1988). As Abramowitz and Saunders have noted:
Since 1980, there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of Republican
identifiers and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of Democratic identifiers in the electorate . . . Republican gains have been very uneven among different groups of voters. The largest gains have occurred among groups with consevative policy preferences . . . There has been a substantial intergenerational
shift in party identification in favor of the GOP—today’s voters are considerably
more Republican and less Democratic than were their parents (1998).
Abramowitz and Saunders have confirmed that the greater the tendency to identify as an
ideological conservative, the greater an accompanying tendency to identify with the Republican
Party. This is what has happened with evangelical and mainline Protestants, thus many observers
have also expected this to happen among Catholic voters as well, although the latter expectation
has not come to fruition (Prendergast 1999).
Political Scientists usually refer to two different conceptions of realignment theory. First,
there is an adjustment in party support which is electorate-wide, during which the overall support
given to one major party increases among the electorate on an aggregate level. The other
realignment conception-- the one which will be utilized in this study-- refers to adjustments
among specific groups of voters who constitute a segment of an electoral coalition (Dalton 1988;
Manza and Brooks 1999; Nardulli 1995). Despite the different conceptualizations in the
realignment literature, both theories share a common element: that an enduring interruption in
long-term electoral behavior occurs followed by stabilization thereafter (Brady and Hurley 1985;
Lawrence and Fleisher 1987; Nardulli 1995).
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Despite the absence of national trauma, the U.S. electorate has been engaged in a
secular, long-term realignment (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). In 1980, the Democratic party
had a distinct partisan identification advantage over the Republicans, 54% to 32%. In 1992,
overall Republican identifiers had increased to 41%, while those who identified as Democrats
had decreased to 48%. By the 2000 election, the gap in party identification continued to close
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Explaining this secular realignment in the absence of serious
political disturbance will be central to elucidating Catholic partisan ties. Testing Catholic
partisanship against religious commitment provides an excellent opportunity to discern the
existence of a cleavage among Catholics based upon ideology. The realignment beginning in
1980, in the electorate as a whole, is based upon the ideological polarization of the two parties
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Fiorina 1995; Niemi and Weisberg 2001). An increasingly
liberal Democratic party and an increasingly conservative Republican party has caused liberals
and conservatives to move toward the respective political parties. In addition, the electorate as a
whole has become more aware of the ideological differences between the Democratic and
Republican parties (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Hence, conservative ideology and
religious commitment have a direct and strong relationship upon partisan identification
(Kellstedt 1993; Layman and Carsey 1998; Wald 1997). This is an insightful finding, as it
illustrates the importance of religious voters for the Republican party and explains the causes of
the partisan realignment since 1980. It also enhances the puzzle of the Catholic resistance to
realignment. Has the expected shift among religious and conservative voters since the election of
Ronald Reagan “trickled-down” among Catholic voters as well?

14

Measuring Religious Commitment
In their seminal work on religiosity, Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American
Politics, some of the nation’s most well-known scholars collaborated in their efforts to clarify
measurement questions of religiosity, and to examine the salience of religious commitment upon
electoral behavior. Leege et al. are among the scholars who have contributed to the creation of
this atlas for the study of religion in our political system. What is most useful in this tome of
religion and politics is perhaps the strategies to conceptualize and operationalize and measure
religious commitment, salience, and the connection between religious beliefs and political
philosophies.
Before 1980, there was scant information for social scientists to utilize in order to study
the effects of religiosity upon political behavior. Up to that year, only basic information about
attendance and affiliation were collected by NES researchers. With the rise of the Christian Right
(Black and Black 2002; Layman 1997; Wald 1997), and a desire for political scientists and
politicians to understand the dynamics of this movement, NES researchers began to collect more
data about religiosity. As Wald and Smidt state:
Like their colleagues in other social science disciplines, political scientists who
study religion have embraced the empirical research methods associated with
the ‘behavioral’ revolution. Though researchers have not abandoned the philosophical, legal, and historical approaches dominant in the prebehavioral era,
the political relevance of religion is increasingly appraised ‘scientifically.’ In
practice, this means analyzing quantitative data obtained through sample surveys.
Since the1980s, when the resurgence of fundamentalist political concern virtually
forced the topic of ‘religion and politics’ onto the mainstream research agenda,
academic journals and presses have increasingly published survey-based studies
of religious influences on mass political behavior (1993).
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Despite the relative growth industry in the literature on religion and politics that
developed during the 1980s, an effective measurement strategy to gauge religiosity and its effect
upon partisanship has been elusive. Wald and Smidt (1993) added inestimably to the study of
religion and politics by establishing guidelines for measurement strategies for religiosity or
religious commitment. Wald and Smidt state that “the first responsibility is to think
systematically about how religious variables may influence political thinking and behavior”
(1993). These scholars reject the basic unidimensional approach to gauging religiosity or
religious commitment. Church attendance alone as a measure of religious commitment is
inadequate when used as an isolated measurement. The broad conceptualization of attendance as
the sole marker of religiosity is flawed because it is not elastic enough to incorporate private
devotion or religious activities outside of a church building. In addition, the attendance measure
is susceptible to social desirability effects, or what is also known as preference falsification.
Respondents may be motivated to inflate their frequency of going to church, as religion is
generally valued as a positive social behavior. Wald and Smidt (1993) advocate measurement
strategies which approach religiosity from two perspectives, believing and belonging. These two
concepts will measure, according to these scholars, both personal and social aspects of religiosity
and grant a more complete view of the influence of religion upon social behavior, in particular,
electoral decision-making.
Scholars have recognized the inadequacy of church attendance, the belonging aspect, as
the sole variable in measuring religious commitment. To remedy this, the believing aspect,
salience of religion in one’s life, has been added to supplement the gauge of religiosity. The
efficacy of this two-pronged approach is noted by Campbell who states that “In the absence of

16

more detailed measures . . . these items capture two of the most relevant dimensions of
religiosity” (2002, p. 213). This is especially important given the decline of the old cleavage of
denominationalism, and the rise of the new values-based orthodoxy cleavage (Dalton 1988;
Manza and Brooks 1998). As denominationalism has become less relevant:
The advantage of these two questions is that they are less idiosyncratic to
particular religious traditions than many measures of religious commitment,
such as Protestant-oriented questions about biblical inerrancy and being “born
again.” Testing the claim that religious dedication trumps denomination as an
influence on party ID requires measures of religiosity that carry across religious
traditions (Campbell 2002, p. 213).
Clearly, the belonging-believing approach enhances our gauging of commitment, controls
the limiting aspect of denominationalism, and effectively augments our ability to analyze the
array of diverse religious groups within the American electorate.
It has been noted that since 1980 there has been a rather dramatic shift in partisanship
within the electorate despite the absence of any significant national trauma (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998; Kellstedt 1993). This partisan adjustment has been classified as an ideological
realignment, and has been discussed in the first chapter of this work. This is an essential point to
consider and develop when discussing the possibility of religious identifiers realigning due to
ideological classification. First, the strength of ideological identification as an influence on vote
choice and partisanship is significant because it explains electoral behavior which has hitherto
not been explained sufficiently by variables such as economic evaluations. Second, ideological
identification can also help explain the partisan realignment which has occurred since 1980, with
evidence demonstrating that committed religious identifiers who claim a conservative ideology
have moved into the Republican party (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Kellstedt 1993; Miller
and Wattenberg 1984; Layman 1997; Wald 1997; Wagner 1998). Therefore, it is crucial to the
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study of religiosity and partisanship to establish the importance of ideological preference in the
electorate as a whole and among religious identifiers in particular.

Population Replacement and Generational Change
As recent research has suggested, the Democratic and Republican parties have
increasingly divided along religious and ideological lines, especially since the presidential
election of 1980 (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman and Carmines 1998; Wald 1997).
Voters with higher levels of religious commitment and conservative ideology tend to identify
with Republicans, while secular and liberal identifiers typically associate with the Democrats
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman 1997). As previously noted, this religious and
ideological polarization has contributed to the development of a new values-based cleavage
within the electorate, replacing the previous religious affiliation-based cleavages of the early and
mid-twentieth century (Dalton 1988; Manza and Brooks 1998). Therefore, the electorate has
entered a realigning period since 1980 (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). As Beck has stated,
during an era of adjusting partisan levels within the electorate, the new cleavage within the
voting population is most likely to be found at its highest levels among the earliest generation
which has entered the electorate. Younger voters are more likely, according to Beck, to sever the
partisan continuity which is the hallmark of a non-realigning era (Beck 1974; Campbell 2002).
The advent of a realigning period within American politics presents an excellent
opportunity to test the validity of the premise that electoral change occurs most dramatically
among younger voters. Key has posited that the gradual nature of a secular realignment is due,
in part, to generational shifts in party allegiance (1959). This agrees nicely with the Michigan
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model of party identification which states that party ID, like religious affiliation, is largely static
and rigid, not easily moved by extrinsic variables (Campbell 2002; Converse 1976). Of course,
the implications of party identification are also well known, for it has been demonstrated that its
link with vote choice has proven to be resilient and durable (Converse 1976; Miller and Shanks
1996). Niemi and Weisberg state that
After being under attack for decades, the view that partisanship is a major
determinant of the vote received a significant boost . . . ‘partisan voting’the relationship between self-reported partisanship and vote choice-declined
in the 1970s but underwent a strong revival in presidential elections in the
1980s and 1990s. Thus, while there might be turbulent times, such as in the
1960s and 1970s, in which the partisan division of the electorate is less important and the predictability of elections is reduced, they are the exception
and party identification remains a potent variable for explaining individual
voting decisions and election outcomes (p.182, 2001).

Clearly, the nearly indissoluble link between partisanship and vote choice makes
understanding partisan allegiance indispensable. In addition, the concept of static party ID elicits
numerous questions with regard to Catholic voters in the American electorate: Are the youngest
generation of Catholic voters realigning toward the Republican party? Are generational
differences causing a partisan cleavage among Catholic voters? Does a generational cleavage
account for the “swing vote” status of Catholics? (Guth and Green 1991; Jelen 1993; Wagner
1998). The current period of ideological realignment allows for a test of these questions of
generational change (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998).
Even scholars who have been critical of realignment theory have attributed the
gradual nature of partisan adjustment to population replacement and generational change
within the electorate in general. (Carmines and Stimson 1981). A division of Catholics into three
generational cohorts will allow me to test for and determine whether this change is occurring
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among Catholic voters in particular. Scholars have classified three generations of Catholic voters
into the following categories: the pre-Vatican II/New Deal generation which entered the
electorate between 1940 and 1960; the Vatican II/JFK generation which came into the electorate
between 1960 and 1980; and the post-Vatican II/Ronald Reagan generation which has become
part of the electorate since 1980 (Mockabee 2004; Leege 2000; Wagner 1998). Testing the age
cohorts for partisanship and religious commitment levels should advance our understanding of
the Catholic voter in American politics.

Partisanship

One of the most significant alterations in partisanship during the past forty years
has been the movement of ideologically conservative Christians from the ranks of the
Democratic party into the Republican party. This change has been most noteworthy among
evangelical and mainline Protestants; however, the partial change in Catholic partisanship has
not gone unnoticed. As E.J. Dionne wrote in his June 18, 2000 Washington Post column,
“Republicans would not now control Congress—and would not have a chance in presidential
elections—if they hadn’t succeeded in roughly doubling the 20-or-so percent share of the
Catholic vote they got in JFK’s election” (Dionne 2000). Clearly, continued movement of
Catholic voters into the Republican Party would cause dramatic changes in the outcome of
elections at the presidential and sub-presidential levels. Explaining why Catholics have been
much slower than their Protestant brethren in realigning with the Republican party and
determining which Catholics have realigned will be the central focus of this thesis.
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Vote Choice

Catholic voting behavior has been divided, defying the expected pattern of ideological realignment. In 1980, both Catholics and Protestants- mainline and evangelicals-voted for
Reagan. In 1984, greater percentages of these voters all increased their support for Reagan’s reelection. In 1988, Protestants continued to vote for the Republican Presidential candidate;
whereas a majority of Catholics supported the Democratic nominee, Michael Dukakis. In both
1992 and 1996, Protestant support for the Republican presidential nominee continued to expand,
as did increased Republican Party identification. Catholics, conversely, although their
identification as Democrats had fallen to 41 percent by 1992, down from 49 percent in 1980,
were now reverting to supporting Democratic presidential candidates. Unlike Protestant
identifiers whose partisanship and voting behavior moved in a predictable way as the parties
became more ideologically polarized, Catholics seem to have only become more divided,
decreasing in their identification with the Democrats while increasing support for their
presidential candidates. The importance of vote choice rests on the notion that it is a primary
indicator of partisan change (Kamieniecki 1985; Key 1955). As Key has stated, elections and
voting are formal acts of collective decision-making which are connected in a stream of
antecedent and subsequent behavior (1955). The evidence presented displays the challenge of
understanding Catholic voting behavior, as these voters seem to demonstrate, with their “swing
vote” status, a much more feeble relationship between partisanship and vote choice than is
traditionally recognized (Erickson and Romero 1989; Wagner 1998).
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Commentators, pundits, and political scientists alike have all been anticipating a more
energetic realignment within the Catholic electorate. The reason for this is twofold. First,
Catholic voters are generally considered to be predominately ideologically conservative
(Mockabee 2004; Prendergast 1998; Wald 1997). In addition, the Catholic Church has
traditionally been recognized as extremely ideologically conservative, both institutionally and
doctrinally. These facts make explaining the modest shift in Catholic partisanship toward the
conservative party, the Republicans, even more extraordinary.
As 29 percent of those who voted in the 1996 presidential election identified as Catholic,
compared to 22 and 28 percent mainline and evangelical Protestant respectively, these “swing
voters” will continue to be an important segment of the voting population. Because Catholic
voters have not behaved in a monolithic fashion, this group will continue to grow in significance,
perhaps determining the winners and losers in American politics. Establishing which Catholics
have realigned, and determining whether partisan realignment will continue will add to our
understanding of the religious factor in politics and perhaps to the electoral fortunes of the major
political parties for decades to come.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS

Data for this thesis will be taken from the American National Election Studies (NES),
from 1980 through 2000. Since NES data first included measurements and indicators of
religiosity and religious salience beginning in 1980, that year marks a necessary starting point for
analysis. The election of 1980 is also an excellent point to begin investigation of Catholic
political behavior as this was the first year in which a majority of Catholics had voted for the
Republican candidate for president at a higher percentage than the general population (Wagner
1998). In addition, the Republican and Democratic parties have become increasingly polarized
along religious and ideological lines since 1980 (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman
1997). Therefore, the study of the effect of the religious factor upon partisanship in general, and
its effect upon Catholic voters in particular, necessarily begins with the presidential election of
1980.
Data will be pooled into two distinct time-periods: 1980 through 1990, the Reagan-Bush
era, and 1992 through 2000, the Clinton era. This strategy of periodization serves two main
purposes. First, it will eliminate any potential numerical deficiency which may occur when
measuring specific groups. The pooling of data ensures a respectable sample size for analysis. In
addition, periodization is useful as it allows for the testing of independent variables during the
presidencies of conservative Republicans, and the presidency of Bill Clinton who was
increasingly viewed as a “New Deal” liberal and is now considered an impetus for the ever
increasing ideological realignment within the electorate. The Clinton presidency also featured

23

extended ideological conflict with the conservative Republican leadership in Congress
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Black and Black 2002).
The literature on religion and political behavior has established that group-level analysis
must focus upon white, non-Latino religious identifiers. Comparing the party identification of
religious blacks, whether Protestant or Catholic, with non-religious or secular blacks, provides
no great distinction as black voters have remained overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party
(Campbell 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Leege 2000). Therefore, to include blacks in the
analysis would suppress any relationship between independent variables that effect party
identification (Leege 2000; Wald 1997).
In addition, the political behavior of Hispanics is also difficult to study. Although
Hispanics are the fastest growing minority in the United States, they remain ethnically diverse
and numerically small for a separate racial or ethnic category, even with data pooled over several
years (Leege 2000; Mockabee 2004). As the Hispanic population continues to expand, scholars
will, in the future, be able to gather the necessary data to analyze this growing constituency. For
now, data analyzed to study the effects of religiosity upon political behavior must be restricted to
white, non-Latino comparison groups (Leege 2000).
In explaining political behavior, the most significant, influential, and durable variable that
affects vote choice is party identification (Bartels 2000; Converse 1976; Niemi and Weisberg
2001; Miller and Shanks 1996). Therefore, the logical dependent variable in the study of
Catholic electoral behavior is partisanship as it is the most accurate indicator of long-term,
secular change. Although there has been steady erosion in Catholic affiliation with the
Democratic Party since the election of 1960, a plurality of white Catholic voters still have an
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attachment to the Democrats (Prendergast 1998). As the political parties become more
ideologically polarized and white religious evangelical and mainline Protestants continue to
move toward the Republican Party, an explanation for the continued allegiance of white
Catholics to the Democratic Party remains elusive (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Carmines
and Stanley 1992; Layman 1997). Partisanship is the dependent variable which I seek to explain
and will be operationalized using the standard seven-point scale (1 will represent strong
Democrat, 2 will be for those who are weak Democrat, while 3 indicates independent Democrat
status. 4 will code those voters who consider themselves “independents,” while 5 indicates the
independent Republican. 6 and 7 will denote weak and strong Republicans respectively). This
scale gives a more detailed picture of the strength of partisan attachment (Mockabee 2004).
To explain the variation in partisanship among Catholics, I will test an array of
independent variables in order to determine the relationship between these variables and party
identification. The independent variables utilized are those which have been recognized as
influencing political behavior (Layman 1997; Wald 1997). These variables include sociodemographic attributes and policy or issue attitudes. Testing these variables among Catholic,
evangelical, and mainline Protestant voters will allow me to determine if Catholic partisanship is
being affected by these variables in a manner similar to their Protestant counterparts. If indeed
denominational differences have been declining since the 1970s, similar effects among Catholic
and Protestant voters would be expected.
Socio-demographic variables include levels of educational achievement, income levels,
gender, age cohort, urbanism, household union membership, and religious commitment. As was
noted in the previous chapter, generational categories will be defined by three distinct cohorts.
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These cohorts are divided into the following groups: The World War II/New Deal generation,
born before 1940, the JFK/Vatican II generation Catholics born between 1941 and 1960, and the
Reagan/John Paul II Catholic, those born after 1960, entering the electorate in 1980. These years
are logical demarcations as they delineate notable events in the history of American Catholicism
and have been deemed by scholars as an effective measurement strategy (Leege 2000; Mockabee
2004). In addition, these generational cohorts are also an effective way to measure Protestant
voters as well. The New Deal/ World War II, JFK/Baby boomer, and Ronald Reagan generation
divisions also categorize Protestants in logical generation groups (Campbell 2002).
Religious commitment or religiosity is an important independent variable, as it has been
viewed by many scholars as one factor in the polarization of the political parties, ideological
realignment, and the basis of societal and political cleavage (Layman 1997; Layman and
Carmines 1997; Mockabee 2004; Wald 1997). Commitment will be measured using the
belonging/believing strategy of attendance at church services and salience of religion in one’s
daily life. For attendance, respondents are asked “if they attend religious services . . . every
week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?” A five-point
scale will be used to code these responses (1 signifies attendance every week, 2 almost every
week, 3 represents once or twice per month, 4 a few times per year, 5 signifies no church
attendance).
For salience, respondents are asked if “religion provides no guidance in your day-to-day
life, some guidance, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day life?”
A four-point scale will code theses responses (1 representing no guidance, 2 some, 3 quite a bit
of guidance, 4 will represent a great deal of guidance). These items included in the commitment

26

measurement strategy model have been demonstrated to be effective indicators of religiosity for
Catholics and Protestants (Kellstedt 1993: Layman 1997; Mockabee 2004).
A religious commitment scale will then allow for the separation of religious identifiers
into two distinct categories: high and low commitment levels. Those who register as highly
committed on the salience measure will state that religion provides quite a bit of guidance or a
great deal of guidance in their daily lives. Those who register as highly committed on the
attendance measure will state that they attend church services every week, almost every week, or
once or twice per month. Meeting these criteria will classify an individual as highly committed
on the religiosity index.
Conversely, those who state that religion provides no guidance or just some guidance in
their daily lives, and those who only attend church services a few times per year or never will be
coded as having a low commitment level. This structure has been utilized by scholars as an
effective means for classifying individual religiosity. As Kellstedt has noted:
It is not surprising to find that the practice dimension and the salience
dimension are so highly correlated . . . [T]he least religious category is
combined and compared with the highest category of religious commitment. The findings are robust: the most religious whites differ from the
least religious on all ten (policy) variables. Demographic variables are
controlled for and, hence are not having an impact here, but religious
commitment is (p.295;1993).
Scholars (Kellstedt 1993; Leege 1993; Layman 1997; Wald 1997) agree that the salience and
attendance measurement scale for religious commitment has internal consistency and
is thus an effective way to gauge how religion affects political behavior. This measure will be
used for Catholic, evangelical, and mainline Protestant identifiers. Socio-demographic variables,
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policy attitudes, and partisan identification will then be regressed against each group. The
coefficients will then be analyzed to determine statistical significance.
Education achievement levels will be coded on a five-point scale(1 representing 12th
grade or less, no diploma, 2 will represent high school graduates, 3 will reflect respondents with
some college, but no degree, 4 will represent B.A. level degrees, 5 reflects persons with
advanced degrees).
For gender, number 1 will reflect males, while number 2 will represent females.
The urbanism variables will be coded on a three-point scale (1 designating metropolitan areas, 2
represents suburbs, 3 reflects small towns and rural areas). Union households will be coded as
number 1, while non-union households will be coded number 2. A five-point scale will be
utilized also to reflect income levels (1 will reflect the 0-16th percentile; 2 the 17th-33d
percentile, 3 the 34-67th percentile, 4 represents the 68-95th percentile, and 5 reflecting the top
1% of wage earners, 96-100th percentile)
Attitudes on contemporary issues and ideological identification have also been
shown to affect partisanship (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Carmines and Stimson 1981;
Green and Gunth 1993). Ideology will be measured using the standard seven-point selfidentification scale, with higher values indicating more conservative views (1 will signify
extremely conservative, 2 conservative, 3 represents slightly conservative, 4 will signify
moderates on the ideological scale, 5 represents slightly liberal, 6 liberal, while 7 signifies
extreme liberalism). This is the ideological scale utilized in the NES surveys since 1972.
Racial attitudes are measured using a question about government aid to blacks.
Respondents are asked to place themselves on this seven-point scale with regard to the
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following scenario: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every
effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the
government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help
themselves. Where would place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought about it?”
A seven-point scale will be utilized. All scales utilized in this thesis will designate higher values
on the scale as representative of the most conservative positions.
Other variables used to measure policy attitudes include a question asking respondents
views on government guarantee of jobs and the standard of living scale, and the government
services, spending tradeoff scale. On government guarantee of jobs and the standard of living
variable, respondents are asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale, with seven
representing the most conservative position and one representing the liberal. The question to
measure this variable is as follows: “Some people feel that the government should see to it that
every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think that the government should
just let each person get ahead on his/her own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven’t you thought much about this?”
Another question which measures economic policy attitudes refers to government
services and spending. Respondents are asked to place themselves on the seven-point scale, with
seven representing the most conservative position. The question is designed to measure
individual attitudes toward the size and scope of government involvement in our daily lives:
“Some people think that the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as
health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the
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government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”
On social issues, two variables are included as indicators of attitudes: abortion and the
role of women in society. The abortion question will measure respondent’s views on a four-point
scale, with higher values indicating the most pro-life position. For women’s role in politics and
society, a four-point scale will be used with a “women’s place is in the home” representing the
most conservative position. Finally, a question measuring attitudes on national defense will be
captured using a seven-point scale on military spending, with higher values indicating support
for increased funding. The questions used measure economic and cultural policy positions and
were chosen because they were consistently used by researchers between 1980 and 2000. A
multivariate analysis will be invoked to aid in determining the weight of each independent
variable while holding the other variables constant. The Ordinary Least Squares regression
model will allow me to compare the beta coefficients, establishing which independent variables
are the most significant with regard to their effect upon partisanship (Mockabee 2004).
As Leege (2000) has noted, the dynamics of the modest shift in partisan allegiance by
Catholic voters has remained elusive to scholars of religion and politics. The model will seek to
measure these socio-demographic and policy variables in order to detect any significant change
among Catholic identifiers. Only considerable changes in variables over-time can account for
changing partisan allegiance among Catholic voters.
Although scholars have recognized that differences in religious affiliation have a less
dramatic effect upon predicting vote choice, the astounding multiplicity of religious
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traditions in the United States requires scholars to create a framework of manageable groups of
religious identifiers for the purpose of empirical analysis (Layman 1997; Miller and Wattenberg
1984; Wald 1997). There has been a rather large and convincing amount of evidence which
demonstrates that highly committed religious identifiers tend to be drawn to the Republican
Party, while those who tend not to be committed to religious orthodoxy and traditionalism along
with secular identifiers, tend to support the Democratic party (Layman 1997; Miller and
Wattenberg 1984; Wald 1997). Despite this fact, researchers have established a model to
separate and isolate members of different religious traditions for the purpose of analysis, which
is central to the phenomenon I seek to explain here. Even though affiliation has, in a general
sense, diminished as a factor in cleaving groups in their political behavior, there are clearly
substantial differences between Protestant and Catholic identifiers and their respective partisan
affiliation, as Protestants have been substantially more Republican than Catholics.
Scholars have attempted to create a framework that accounts for differences in
religious traditions while also classifying identifiers into logical groups for analysis. The
success claimed by political scientists who study religion and politics has also been accompanied
by some limitations (Layman 1997; Wald 1997). The NES data collected each election cycle
usually consists of some 2,000 or fewer interviews. Members of religious traditions outside the
conventional Christian traditions—Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and other religious minorities—
cannot be included in analysis due to the small numbers of these religious identifiers. Even
certain sub-groups of Christians, those who depart from traditional doctrine—Mormons,
Christian Scientists, and Unitarians—are excluded because too few turn up in survey data to
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give us an accurate impression of the religious traditions in the general population (Layman
1997; Wald 1997).
Despite this limitation, these groups, Protestant and Catholic, constitute almost 90 percent
of the adult voting population in the United States, and give us insight into the religious beliefs
and faiths of an overwhelming majority of Americans (Kellstedt 1993; Layman 1997; Wald
1997). Excluding these religious minorities from data analysis still leaves scholars with the task
of dividing dozens of Christian denominations into manageable groups of religious traditions.
For the purpose of analysis here, the model to examine socio-demographic variables and policy
attitudes will be applied to Roman Catholics as well as evangelical and mainline Protestants.
These divisions serve a two-fold purpose; they create a set of groups with a consistent religious
tradition, and they allow researchers to compare and contrast the differences between these major
religious traditions in order to assess the effect of religious commitment, policy attitudes, and
socio-demographic variables upon political behavior (Wald 1997). Separating these religious
traditions, comparing and contrasting their views on policy questions, analyzing their sociodemographic qualities, as well as their partisan and ideological identification should illustrate
any differences or similarities in party affiliation between and among these religious identifiers
(Campbell 2002; Jelen 1993; Wald 1997).
Examining Roman Catholics as a group is much simpler than studying Protestants, for
there are no formal denominational divisions within Catholicism. In addition, Catholicism has an
extended historical tradition and a central teaching authority, the Pope, which minimizes
theological differences or controversies. Also, Catholic respondents are easily recognized in NES
data collection. Separating and analyzing Protestants, however, has proven to be rather
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problematic (Campbell 2002; Layman 1997; Wald 1997). Within Protestantism there are dozens
of denominations with significant theological differences (Wald 1997). Therefore, a framework
to distinguish mainline and evangelical Protestants has been developed by scholars (Green and
Guth 1993; Kellstedt 1993).
As Kellstedt (1993) has noted there are serious doctrinal differences between mainline
and evangelical Protestants. The former are from Reformation-era traditions,e.g. Lutherans,
Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterian Church USA, United Church of Christ,
Congregationalist Christian, and Disciples of Christ which are ritualistic and sacramentally based
and politically are characterized by economic conservatism and social justice concerns (Layman
1997). Mainline Protestant churches have hierarchical structures and their members register on
the higher end of the socio-economic scale.
Evangelicals are considered post-Reformation sects, typified by the profession of biblical
inerrancy and personal salvation; with emphasis upon conversion, missions, and evangelism.
Evangelical churches lack a hierarchical organization and their members usually register lower
on the socio-economic scale than do mainline Protestants or Catholics (Wald 1997). The
denominations described as evangelical include Seventh-day Adventists, Church of the Brethren,
Evangelical Covenant, Evangelical Free, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Church of the
Nazarene, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Fundamentalist Adventist, Missouri Synod,
American Baptist Churches USA, Southern Baptist Convention, National Association of Free
Will Baptists, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, and the Church of God (Layman 1997). In
contemporary American politics, evangelicals usually register as highly committed to their
religion and hold conservative policy positions (Kellstedt 1993; Layman 1997; Wald 1997)
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These distinctions require researchers, for purpose of analysis, to categorize these adherents into
two distinct religious groupings. For this thesis, analyzing the effects of the independent
variables upon partisanship, both mainline and evangelical, as well as Roman Catholic, should
confirm the continued religious and ideological cleaving of the American electorate.
In addition, the inter-religious comparison will allow me to demonstrate the differences
in the weight of independent variables between and among these groups of religious
identifiers. This research model, by incorporating a cross comparison, will allow me to more
readily observe and analyze the strength and direction these variables are having on Catholic
partisanship.
In comparing Catholic identifiers with evangelical and mainline Protestants, I
hypothesize that ideological identification has replaced religious affiliation as a prime mover of
partisan identification. Among these religious groups, conservatives are highly committed and
have identified as Republicans, while liberal, non-committed identifiers have become more
affiliated with the Democratic Party. Although younger members of each religious tradition are
more likely than previous generations to become Republican, lower numbers of highly
committed religious identifiers among Catholics, coupled with the static nature of Democratic
partisanship among older generation Catholics, help explain the lower aggregate level of
Republican affiliation among Catholic voters.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

As a first step in providing an explanation for the partisan identification of Catholic
voters in the American electorate, it is useful to present and analyze partisan identification
between 1980 and 2000. Again, measuring partisanship is important when studying electoral
behavior as it is the most effective indicator of change within the electorate as well as a most
reliable indicator of vote choice. Therefore, establishing the partisan trends among Catholics
over this time-period is a necessary starting point for my analysis. In addition, a comparison of
partisan trends among evangelical and mainline Protestants with Catholic voters will augment
any similarities or differences which may exist among these religious identifiers. Comparing and
contrasting partisan trends among these groups will help determine whether there has been a
decline in denominationalism and a rise in religiosity as the base of political cleavage within the
American electorate.
In order to effectively assess partisan tendencies, frequency distributions are presented in
Tables 1, 2, and 3. The frequency output was conducted between committed and non-committed
identifiers, in all three religious traditions, in order to determine if levels of religiosity are
producing significant differences in partisan identification. In addition, an illustration of partisan
identification also amplifies the puzzle of Catholic political behavior. As Table 1 indicates, for
most of the period between 1980 and 2000, partisan identification between committed and noncommitted Catholics was not dramatically different. Not until the mid-to-late 1990s does the
committed/non-committed cleavage become evident among Catholic voters.

35

Table 1 Catholic Partisan Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-committed %

1980

Dem.
53.8

Ind .
12.3

Rep. N
33.8 130

Dem.
54.3

Ind .
14.2

Rep. N
31.2 141

1984

Dem.
52.5

Ind .
10.0

Rep. N
37.5 200

Dem.
46.8

Ind .
11.6

Rep. N
41.0 173

1986

Dem.
53.6

Ind .
8.2

Rep. N
37.1 97

Dem.
51.0

Ind .
9.8

Rep. N
36.3 102

1988

Dem.
50.4

Ind .
6.6

Rep. N
41.6 137

Dem.
42.5

Ind .
9.8

Rep. N
46.6 174

1990

Dem.
59.3

Ind .
8.1

Rep. N
32.0 172

Dem.
53.8

Ind .
5.4

Rep. N
40.2 174

1992

Dem.
50.7

Ind .
13.0

Rep. N
36.2 207

Dem.
54.1

Ind .
10.6

Rep. N
35.3 207

1994

Dem.
50.0

Ind .
13.9

Rep. N
36.1 166

Dem.
49.2

Ind .
9.8

Rep. N
41.0 183

1996

Dem.
52.8

Ind .
7.4

Rep. N
38.7 163

Dem.
51..2

Ind .
7.8

Rep. N
40.4 166

1998

Dem.
43.8

Ind .
10.5

Rep. N
44.8 105

Dem.
49.7

Ind .
9.7

Rep. N
39.4 155

2000

Dem.
43.5

Ind .
7.1

Rep. N
48.2 170

Dem.
48.4

Ind .
11.3

Rep. N
39.2 186

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000. 1982 is not presented as measure of religiosity was not used for that year.
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Table 2 Evangelical Partisan Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-Committed%

1980

Dem.
52.2

Ind .
10.1

Rep. N
34.1 138

Dem.
48.4

Ind .
13.0

Rep. N
38.2 123

1984

Dem.
30.5

Ind .
8.6

Rep. N
58.4 197

Dem.
43.0

Ind .
15.2

Rep. N
39.4 165

1986

Dem.
37.6

Ind .
11.1

Rep. N
49.6 117

Dem.
45.9

Ind .
25.9

Rep. N
27.1 85

1988

Dem.
38.6

Ind .
9.7

Rep. N
51.7 207

Dem.
41.2

Ind .
11.8

Rep. N
44.4 153

1990

Dem.
38.6

Ind .
10.8

Rep. N
48.9 223

Dem.
45.5

Ind .
15.9

Rep. N
33.8 145

1992

Dem.
35.9

Ind .
8.0

Rep. N
33.6 276

Dem.
44.4

Ind .
13.9

Rep. N
39.1 151

1994

Dem.
33.6

Ind .
9.3

Rep. N
55.1 214

Dem.
36.2

Ind .
11.2

Rep. N
52.6 116

1996

Dem.
35.9

Ind .
3.6

Rep. N
59.5 195

Dem.
52.9

Ind .
10.8

Rep. N
34.3 102

1998

Dem.
39.8

Ind .
9.3

Rep. N
50.0 118

Dem.
41.4

Ind .
15.7

Rep. N
42.9 70

2000

Dem.
29.5

Ind .
10.2

Rep. N
59.1 176

Dem.
47.6

Ind .
10.5

Rep. N
41.9 107

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000. 1982 is not presented in table as measure of religiosity was not used for that year.
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Table 3 Mainline Partisan Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-committed %

1980

Dem.
34.9

Ind .
10.9

Rep. N
54.3 175

Dem.
41.1

Ind .
13.0

Rep. N
43.9 253

1984

Dem.
34.1

Ind .
3.6

Rep. N
60.6 249

Dem.
38.8

Ind .
8.6

Rep. N
51.8 313

1986

Dem.
32.1

Ind .
10.4

Rep. N
55.2 134

Dem.
40.0

Ind .
13.3

Rep. N
43.6 165

1988

Dem.
36.6

Ind .
8.5

Rep. N
54.5 213

Dem.
35.2

Ind .
10.5

Rep. N
53.3 287

1990

Dem.
41.3

Ind .
7.4

Rep. N
50.3 189

Dem.
37.4

Ind .
11.8

Rep. N
50.0 262

1992

Dem.
36.2

Ind .
6.5

Rep. N
57.3 232

Dem.
35.9

Ind .
13.1

Rep. N
49.7 312

1994

Dem.
28.6

Ind .
7.0

Rep. N
63.8 185

Dem.
35.8

Ind .
6.9

Rep. N
57.4 204

1996

Dem.
34.8

Ind .
8.3

Rep. N
56.9 181

Dem.
41.2

Ind .
7.6

Rep. N
44.5 211

1998

Dem.
36.6

Ind .
9.2

Rep. N
51.1 131

Dem.
44.5

Ind .
10.2

Rep. N
41.6 137

2000

Dem.
31.8

Ind .
8.9

Rep. N
59.4 192

Dem.
51.6

Ind .
12.2

Rep. N
34.6 188

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000. 1982 is not presented in table as measure of religiosity was not used for that year.
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As Table 1 demonstrates, Catholic partisan identification, for committed and
non-committed identifiers, was predominantly Democratic from 1980 through 1996. For
example, in 1980, Democratic partisan identification for committed Catholics was 53.8
percent, while the percentage of Democratic identification among non-committed Catholics was
54.3. Even in the election of 1984, with the massive Reagan landslide victory, a majority of
committed Catholics, 52.5 percent, and non-committed Catholics, 46.8 percent, still identified as
Democratic. It seems that the force of the ideological realignment that has taken place since 1980
did not permeate the ranks of Catholic voters, committed and non-committed alike. Not until
1998, during the second term of Bill Clinton, do we see a substantial shift in Catholic partisan
allegiance. In 1998 and 2000, a majority of Catholic voters who register as committed religious
adherents began to identify as Republican.
Concomitantly, non-committed Catholics remained loyal Democrats with 48.4 percent
identifying with the party in 2000. Non-committed Catholics identifying with the
Republican Party sank to its lowest level since 1992, with 39.2 percent self-described as
Republican. Catholic partisan affiliation, then, is beginning to correspond with the expected
trend of ideological realignment and religious commitment as the base of social and political
cleavage. Although it was not realized until the mid 1990s, religiosity seems to be a driving force
dividing Catholics into the Democratic and Republican parties albeit at a much more modest
level than evangelical and mainline Protestants.
Table 2 shows partisan allegiances among committed and non-committed evangelical
Protestants. Interestingly, this group of religious identifiers, committed and
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non-committed, traditionally have been solid Democrats. In 1980, for example 50.2 percent of
committed evangelicals and 48.0 of non-committed evangelicals were identifying as Democrats.
By 1984 there was a dramatic change in partisan affiliation. In that year, only 30.5 percent of
committed evangelicals identified with the Democrats, while an astonishing 58.4 percent
identified with the Republicans, a 24 point increase from 1980. This trend among committed
evangelicals has accelerated, as they continue to affiliate overwhelmingly with the Republican
Party. By the 2000 election, only 29.5 percent of this group of religious identifiers was affiliated
with the Democratic party. Conversely, the general tendency for a majority of non-committed
evangelicals has been to remain Democratic, as a slight Republican advantage was only evident
in 1988 and 1994. Again, religiosity seems to be fueling a partisan divide among evangelicals as
well.
Table 3 shows mainline Protestants having a solidly Republican tradition in the
1980s and early 1990s. Both religiously committed and non-committed mainline identifiers were
identifying as Republican. For example, 54.3 percent of committed mainline Protestants and 43.9
percent of non-committed identified as Republican in 1980. In 1990, 50.3 percent of committed
members and 50.0 percent of non-committed members identified as Republican. NES data
reveals that since the mid 1990s, a division based upon religious commitment has also become
evident among mainline Protestants, politically cleaving them between the two major parties.
Analyzing the partisan frequency distribution among these religious identifiers reveals some
important trends. First, denominational differences, although they have diminished significantly,
still exist between mainline Protestant and Catholic voters. Partisanship has remained a static
variable with regard to political behavior. Also, the political parties have become ideologically
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polarized, especially since 1980; religious commitment is dividing all three religious groups,
with this division most pronounced among younger voters, hence the ongoing realignment within
these groups is occurring among the youngest generation of identifiers, as the religiously
committed tend to be Republican, while non-committed tend to be more Democratic.
In order to provide empirical conformation that these trends are indeed occurring I will
test for ideology and generational differences. First, an ideological frequency distribution will
allow me to determine the similarities or differences in the ideological self-identification of
Catholics, evangelical, and mainline Protestants. Higher levels of conservatism would explain
movement toward the Republicans, while higher levels of moderate and liberal identifiers may
explain continued Democratic affiliation. In addition, an ideological frequency distribution
among these religious groups should confirm or deny the advent of an ideological realignment
with the electorate and determine if Catholic voters are part of or are becoming part of the
broader ideological realignment within the American electorate. Next, a regression analysis of
ideology and age cohorts will allow me to determine the strength and direction of these variables
upon partisanship. Finally, a regression analysis of issue attitudes and socio-demographic
characteristics will allow me to determine if other variables are having a significant effect upon
partisan affiliation within the American electorate.
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Table 4 Catholic Ideological Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-committed%

1980

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
16.9 20.8 28.5
33.8 130

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
19.9 23.4 25.5 31.2
141

1984

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17. 1 30.0 26.5
26.5 200

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
27.7 24.3 30.1 17.9
173

1986

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.4 29.9 40.2
16.5 97

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17.6 31.4 29.4
21.4 102

1988

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
16.1 22.6 37.2
24.1 137

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17.2 27.0 31.6 24.2 174

1990

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
18.6 26.7 26.7
28.0 172

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17.9 26.1 27.2
28.8 184

1992

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17.4 28.0 34.8
37.2 207

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
23.7 25.6 30.0
20.7 207

1994

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
15.1 22.9 45.8
31.3 166

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
21.9 29.0 31.7
17.4 165

1996

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
20.2 24.5 41.1
14.2 163

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
25.3 29.5 33.7
11.5 166

1998

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.4 26.7 46.7
15.2 105

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
21.9 29.0 32.3
16.8 155

2000

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
5.3 13.5 18.2
63.0 170

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.3 17.2 15.1
56.4 186

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000. 1982 is not presented in table as measure of religiosity was
not used for that year.
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Table 5 Evangelical Ideological Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-committed%

1980

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
3.6 13.0 37.0 46.4
138

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.4 17.9 25.2 56.9
123

1984

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
9.1 16.8 48.2 25.9
197

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
18.8 21.8 21.2 38.2
165

1986

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
3.4 26.5 48.7 21.4
117

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
10.6 25.9 23.5 40.0
85

1988

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
7.2 15.5 43.0 34.3
207

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.7 17.6 30.7 38.0
153

1990

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
8.1 21.5 43.9 26.5
223

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
8.3 24.8 19.3 47.6
145

1992

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
8.0 18.1 45.3 28.6
276

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
17.2 22.5 24.5 35.8
151

1994

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
5.1 19.2 54.7 21.0
214

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
12.1 28.4 37.9 21.6
116

1996

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
8.2 16.4 55.4 20.0
195

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
15.7 23.5 30.4 30.4
102

1998

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
6.8 27.1 45.8 20.3
118

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
10.0 32.9 35.7 21.4
70

2000

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
5.7 5.7 24.4 64.2
176

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.2 15.9 8.4
64.5
107

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000.1982 is not presented in table as measure of religiosity was
not used for that year.
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Table 6 Mainline Ideological Identification, 1980-2000.

Year

Committed %

Non-committed %

1980

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
8.0 24.6 39.4 28.0
175

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
18.2 21.3 30.4 30.1
193

1984

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.3 23.3 43.4 20.0
249

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.7 25.9 31.9 28.5
313

1986

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.9 29.9 43.3 14.9
134

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
18.2 30.9 29.7 21.2
165

1988

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.7 24.4 43.7 20.2
213

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
15.0 24.4 39.0 21.6
287

1990

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
16.9 25.9 28.0 29.2
189

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
16.0 30.2 29.0 24.8
262

1992

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
16.4 25.0 41.4 17.2
232

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
18.6 26.9 33.7 20.8
312

1994

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
9.2 25.4 43.8 21.6
185

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.2 31.4 39.7 15.7
204

1996

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.6 24.9 48.1 15.4
181

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
20.9 24.6 37.0 17.5
211

1998

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
13.0 32.8 40.5 13.7
131

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
19.7 36.5 29.9 13.9
137

2000

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
6.8 12.0 26.0 55.2
191

Lib. Mod. Cons. Missing N
11.2 13.3 12.8
62.7 188

Source: NES Data, 1980-2000.1982 is not presented in table as specific measure of
religiosity was not used for that year.
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As expected, Table 4 provides support for the cleaving of Catholic voters based upon
religiosity and ideology. Among committed Catholics, the trend has been, since 1980, to
increasingly self-identify as conservative. For example, in 1980, 28.5 percent of committed
Catholics identified as conservative, compared with 46.7 percent in 1998. The data demonstrate a
consistent trend of rising levels of conservatism among committed Catholics, while liberal and
moderate identifiers within this sub-group remained stable.
Between 1980 and 2000, ideological identification among non-committed Catholics
remained rather stable. However, when compared to committed Catholics, a dramatic distinction
emerges that amplifies the growing ideological cleavage among Catholic voters. In 1980, among
committed and non-committed Catholics, there existed a 3-point difference in liberal and
conservative identification. Table 4 shows that liberal identifiers among committed and noncommitted Catholics were 16.9 percent and 19.9 percent respectively. Similarly, conservative
identification among committed and non-committed Catholics was at 28.5 percent and 25.5
percent respectively. This affirms that religious commitment was not a base of political division
among Catholics in 1980.
By 1998, however, the difference between committed and non-committed Catholics who
identified as conservative or liberal grew to 14-points and 10-points respectively, thus suggesting
further that religious commitment is playing a role as a determinate of ideology and is serving as
a source for political division among Catholics. The stable and consistent trend among
committed and non-committed Catholics between 1980 and 2000 becoming ideologically
divided also suggests that religious commitment is serving as a force for partisan realignment
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among Catholics and that denominational differences are in fact diminishing as a source of
political cleavage with the electorate.
The findings in Table 4 indicate that the new chasm between religiously committed and
non-committed Catholics is driving the partisan change established in Table 1. As expected,
while committed Catholics have increased in their frequency of ideological self-identification as
conservatives, there has also been a concomitant increase in their partisan affiliation as
Republicans. This is exemplified by the data in Table 1 that shows that 33.8 percent of
committed Catholics in 1980 identified as Republican, while in 2000 48.2 percent of committed
Catholics identified as Republican, a 15-point increase. These data also show that as liberal
identification among non-committed Catholics has increased, Democratic identification has
remained stable, with non-committed Catholics remaining slightly more Democratic than the
electorate in general. Thus far, the evidence suggests that among Catholic voters, religious
commitment has become an effective predictor of ideological affiliation and partisan
identification. These findings undergird the premise that conservative ideology is linked to
Republican partisan identification. It may also be inferred that religious commitment is driving
partisan change as Republican partisan identification and conservative ideological
identification frequencies are most prevalent among voters who are committed to their religion.
Table 5 provides further support for ideological realignment and religious commitment as
a societal cleavage which manifests itself in secular partisan alteration. Conservative ideological
identification among committed evangelicals was high in 1980 and has remained at extremely
high levels through 2000. As expected and demonstrated in Table 2, the increased conservative
ideological identification by committed evangelicals has been concomitant with increased
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Republican identification. In 1980, Republican identification among committed evangelicals was
at 34.1 percent, however, 59.1 percent of these identifiers registered affiliation with the
Republican party by the election of 2000. Again, as expected, conservative ideological
identification during the same time-period became more prevalent among committed evangelical
voters. Conversely, among non-committed evangelicals, lower levels of conservative
identification between 1980 and 2000 have also meant lower levels of Republican partisan
identification.
Table 6 also provides further evidence to support the notion of an ideological realignment
and the cleaving of committed and non-committed religious identifiers. As the data reveals,
ideological identification among committed mainline Protestants has remained relatively stable
and high. Between 1980 and 2000, there has been very little variance in levels of conservatism
reported among committed mainliners, and their affiliation with the Republican party has also
remained stable and vibrant. What Table 6 does expose is the dramatic rise among noncommitted mainline Protestants who describe themselves as moderates on the ideological scale.
In 1980, 21.3 percent of these identifiers called themselves moderates, compared to 36.5 by
1998. In addition, while levels of moderate identifiers have dramatically increased, Democratic
affiliation among non-committed mainline Protestants between 1980 and 2000 has also markedly
increased. In 1980, 41.1 percent of non-committed mainliners self-identified as Democrats, while
43.9 percent identified as Republican. By the 2000 election, 51.6 percent were affiliating with
the Democratic Party, while only 34.6 percent were associating with the Republicans.
Among all three religious groups, Catholics, evangelicals, and mainline Protestants, there
exists a dramatic shift in partisan affiliation between committed and non-committed members.
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The evidence suggests that shifts in ideological identificationare related to shifts in partisan
affiliation. Among all these groups, rising levels of conservative ideological identification has
been associated with higher levels of Republican identification. As levels of liberal or moderate
identification become more prominent, so do levels of Democratic Party affiliation. Most
interestingly, higher levels of conservatism and Republican identification have become the trend
among committed members of all three religious traditions.
With regard to the Catholic voter, the cross-comparison with Protestant adherents
has revealed some important findings. First, the new cleavage of religiosity is evident among
Catholics and Protestants, suggesting that this phenomenon is a trend which transcends
denominational differences and implies that committed members of each religious tradition will
continue to coalesce into the ranks of the Republican party. Secondly, the data also reveals that
there has been a lag among committed Catholics reporting higher levels of conservatism and
Republican identification. As the trend began with evangelicals in the 1980s and early 1990s,
this pattern did not emerge in any significant manner among committed Catholics until the midto-late 1990s. A regression analysis of socio-demographic and policy attitudes against partisan
identification will present a more robust examination of the effects of the specific variables that
are affecting partisan and ideological change among Catholic voters and will measure the extent
to which these variables differ among committed and non-committed adherents in each religious
group.
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Table 7 Independent Variables and Catholic Partisanship, 1980-1990.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Non-committed
Committed
-.722
-1.911
(Constant)
2.086***
3.124***
Ideology
.160
.015
Gender
-.613
-.333
Union
1.010**
.845
Aid to Minorities
.012
-.287
Abortion
.773
.365
Jobs
2.089**
1.569**
Spend/Service
.256
.786
Income
.438
.502
Education
-.215
.228
Suburban
-.788
-.073
Rural
.087
.033
Region
-.598
.342
Woman’s Role
.299*
.258**
Defense
.172
.807**
Vat II
.582
1.718***
PstVatII
N=228
N=260
Source: American National Election Studies, 1980-1990.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p.001
Variable

Table 7 provides some evidence as to which variables are affecting Catholic partisanship.
During the Reagan/Bush era, 1980 to 1990, ideology and generation were the most significant
variables predicting Republican partisanship among committed Catholics. As hypothesized, the
force of ideological conservatism is causing partisan change, and this change is most evident
among the youngest generation to enter the electorate. Therefore, generational replacement
seems to be producing larger Republican gains within the Catholic electorate. Issues positions
associated with the Republican party, limited government and defense spending, also registered
as significant predictors of Republican partisanship in the regression model. Among non-
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committed Catholics, rural voters and union members were most likely to be Democratic.
Surprisingly, ideology, aid to minorities, government spending, and defense spending were all
significant variables predicting Republican affiliation among non-committed Catholics.
Although generational differences were not statistically significant among the non-committed,
they at least approached significance. Clearly, younger Catholics who are committed are
becoming more Republican. It is also important to note that among non-committed Catholics,
ideology also registered as the most statistically significant variable, suggesting that those noncommitted Catholics who hold conservative policy positions were more likely to be affiliated
with the Republican Party.
The variables in Table 7 which did not register as statistically significant are also worth
noting. Surprisingly, considering the amount of literature on the gender gap, even when ideology
is excluded from analysis, the gender variable did not even approach statistical significance.
When ideology was excluded from the model, the weight of the abortion coefficient, in
regression analysis not shown, gained statistical significance. However, gender did not, and this
was true for both periods examined. This model does not support the “conventional wisdom” of
the political pundits that abortion is the wedge driving the so-called gender gap. In addition,
much attention has been allocated in recent scholarship to the idea that racial conservatism has
been a major impetus in the decline of the Democratic fortunes among Catholic voters. Again,
this model does not support that notion, as racial conservatism was only significant among noncommitted Catholics in the first period, 1980 through 1990. The evidence presented here
suggests that racial conservatism has not been as prominent in determining partisanship among
religious identifiers as many scholars have posited in recent literature.
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Table 8 reviews the strength and direction of independent variables upon partisan
affiliation among committed and non-committed Catholics in the second period, 1992 through
2000. Again, as hypothesized, ideological conservatism and generation continues to achieve
statistical significance, with variables measuring socio-economic status gaining in prominence as
a predictor of partisanship during this time-frame.

Table 8 Independent Variables and Catholic Partisanship, 1992-2000.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Non-committed
Committed
-.992
-1.724
(Constant)
3.999***
3.912***
Ideology
-.121
.207
Gender
-.459*
-.700**
Union
.297
.490
Aid to Minorities
.160
.196
Abortion
.417
.963
Jobs
1.480*
.955
Spend/Service
1.085*
.671
Income
.306
1.121*
Education
-.023
.458
Suburban
.009
-.067
Rural
.009
-.072
Region
.128
.428
Woman’s Role
.076
.105
Defense
.353
.327
Vat II
.865*
.575
Pst Vat II
N=359
N=403
Source: American National Election Studies, 1992-2000.
*p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Variables
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Again, conservative ideology is the dominant variable among Catholic voters in
predicting partisan affiliation. The evidence from the partisan frequency distribution, the
ideological frequency distribution, and the regression model all support the concept of the
emergence of an ideological realignment era, beginning in 1980 and gaining momentum
throughout the 1990s. Importantly, the age cohort also continues to be a powerful explanatory
variable in predicting affiliation, actually gaining statistical significance among non-committed
Catholics during this time-period. Once again, as younger cohorts continue to display Republican
tendencies, the significance of the age cohort in predicting partisan identification is bad news for
the Democratic party. In addition, conservative positions on government intervention in the
economy and government spending gained statistical significance. Socio-demographic variables
such as income and education levels also gained statistical significance. Once again, gender did
not even approach statistical significance, even when ideology was excluded, and the racial
conservatism measure actually lost statistical significance. However, no other variable even
comes close in statistical significance to the ideological variable.
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Table 9 Independent Variables and Evangelical Partisahship, 1980-1990.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Coefficient
Non-committed
Committed
.518
1.311
(Constant)
2.187***
2.330***
Ideology
.376
-.292
Gender
.006
-.261
Union
-.095
-.972
Aid to Minorities
.562
.607
Abortion
.635
.826
Jobs
.516
1.271***
Spend/Service
.660
.088
Income
.458
.636
Education
-.186
.098
Suburban
-.189
-.448
Rural
-.466
-.947*
South
.001
-.069
Region
.715
.640
Woman’s Role
.177
.109
Defense
.011
.610
JFK era
1.473**
.890***
Reagan era
N=265
N=164
Source: American National Election Studies, 1980-1990.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Variables

Table 9 reveals that ideology and generation are the most statistically significant
variables predicting partisan affiliation among evangelical Christians as well. The data continues
to support the thesis of ideological realignment and the notion that a realigning era is most
evident among younger voters. In addition to the usual economic and ideological variables,
residing in the southern United States is a significant variable in predicting party affiliation for
committed evangelicals during the first period (1980-1990), as those religionists who hold
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traditional values continue to be drawn to the Republican party. Again, gender did not even
approach statistical significance, even when controlled for ideology. For committed and noncommitted evangelicals alike, the effect of ideology as a predictor of partisan identification
continues to be the most significant variable. Across all models and in all three religious
traditions, ideology and its effect on partisanship is highly significant (p < .001), with most other
variables lagging far behind.

Table 10 Independent Variables and Evangelical Partisanship, 1992-2000.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Non-committed
Committed
-.766
-.020
(Constant)
2.506***
4.296***
Ideology
.054
.244
Gender
-.399
-.874***
Union
.767
-.700
Aid to Minorities
.181
.751***
Abortion
.671
1.165***
Jobs
1.492
.782
Spend/Services
.238
1.621***
Income
.217
.570
Education
.838
-.261
Suburban
.834
-.494
Rural
-.586
-.077
South
.101
-.065
Region
.136
-.428
Woman’s Role
-.018
.015
Defense
.307
.312
JFK era
.967**
.617**
Reagan era
N=427
N=208
Source: American National Election Studies, 1992-2000.
*p < .05; **p <.01; ***p < .001
Variables
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Table 10 shows how ideology continues to be the dominant independent variable among
committed and non-committed evangelicals alike. As with Catholic voters, ideological
identification is a strong predictor of partisan affiliation. In addition, the age cohort variable also
continues to be statistically significant in the second-period as well among both committed and
non-committed evangelicals, suggesting the persistence of the trend that today’s voters are much
more likely to be Republican than the previous generation. Among committed evangelicals,
income has become another potent predictor of Republican partisanship, suggesting that they are
being propelled toward the Republican party through a mixture of social and economic
conservatism. Again, when ideology is excluded from the regression model, the abortion variable
becomes statistically significant; however, gender does not reach statistical significance.
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Table 11 Independent Variables and Mainline Partisanship, 1980-1990.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Coefficient
Non-committed
Committed
-.299
1.545
(Constant)
3.283***
3.342***
Ideology
.196
.354
Gender
-757***
-.799***
Union
.580
-.004
Aid to Minorities
.824***
.434
Abortion
.194
1.019
Jobs
.769
.969
Spend/Services
.787
-.120
Income
1.187***
-.205
Education
.154
-.272
Suburban
.449
-.479
Rural
-.562
-.587
South
-.023
-.103
Region
.195
-.500
Woman’s Role
.133
.218***
Defense
-.046
-.040
JFK era
-.224
-.041
Reagan era
N=327
N=410
Source: American National Election Studies, 1980-1990.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Variable

Table 11 confirms statistical significance for ideology among committed and noncommitted mainline Protestant identifiers during the first period. In addition, economic positions
are also significant for committed mainliners, while education levels are significant for the noncommitted. As with their Catholic and evangelical counterparts, gender is not a statistically
significant variable for mainliners, even when ideology is excluded from the regression model.
This is the case even though statistical significance for abortion increases when ideology is
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removed, lending further evidence to the idea that abortion may not be the force driving the
gender gap in American politics.

Table 12 Independent Variables and Mainline Partisanship, 1992-2000.

Unstandardized
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Non-committed
Committed
-.699
-.186
(Constant)
3.654***
4.185***
Ideology
.173
.021
Gender
-.234
-.051
Union
.846
.696
Aid to Minorities
.498
.780***
Abortion
.665
.277
Jobs
1.314***
1.186***
Spend/Services
.717
.825
Income
.621
.913**
Education
.269
.494
Suburban
.098
.002
Rural
-.562
-.307
South
.031
-.038
Region
.004
-.142
Women’s Role
.072
-.009
Defense
-.203
-.475
JFK era
-.037
-.138
Reagan era
N=405
N=487
Source: American National Election Studies, 1992-2000.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Variables

Table 12 shows that ideology among mainline Protestants, both committed
and non-committed, is the most statistically significant variable in predicting partisanship.
Interestingly, economic variables have gained statistical significance for committed mainline
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Protestants during the second period, and the JFK era age cohort was not significant. Once again,
when ideology was excluded, the abortion variable gained significance, however, gender did not.
Clearly the evidence from the regression model confirms the ideological realignment
thesis, demonstrating that those who consider themselves to be ideological conservatives are
most likely to be Republican, whether they are committed religionists or non-committed.
However, the frequency of conservative ideological identification and Republican partisan
identification is more likely among the committed. This supports the idea of the decline of
denominationalism, as ideology is the most important determinant of partisanship regardless of
religious affiliation. For Catholic voters, as well as non-Catholics, partisanship is best predicted
by ideology. The regression model shows that Catholics are now becoming part of the broader
ideological realignment which has taken place within the electorate since the election of 1980.
However, there has been a lag in Catholic movement toward the Republican party, as the
regression model shows that ideology as a statistically significant variable was more pronounced
for Catholics in the second period. In addition, the ideological frequency distribution also
illustrates this lag, as the number of committed Catholics identifying as ideologically
conservative was rather anemic until the mid-1990s, when compared to their Protestant
counterparts.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this thesis lends support to important concepts, enhances our
understanding of the Catholic voter, and provides a framework for recognizing the electoral
consequences of the new dynamic of the “Catholic vote.” Clearly, the frequency distributions
and the regression models have demonstrated that ideological affiliation is the strongest predictor
of partisan identification. The party system has dramatically changed since the election of 1980,
and the evidence shows that the electorate has indeed been engaged in an era of partisan
realignment based upon ideology and religious commitment. Within each of the religious
traditions examined, Catholic, evangelical, and mainline Protestant, one variable emerged as
statistically significant, and dramatically significant, among committed and non-committed
members: ideology. This variable was significant among all groups, sub-groups, and in both
periods analyzed. In fact, ideology has become, in the mid-to-late 1990s, an even stronger
predictor of partisanship than in the 1980s. The research model in this thesis supports the idea of
ideological realignment most ably posited by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998).
Beyond this concept, however, it is clear that bases of group support for the parties have
also changed since 1980. Conservatives are much more apt to be affiliated with the Republican
party, and liberals with the Democratic party, a basic tenet of the ideological realignment theory
which has been affirmed in this model. In addition, those who are committed to their religion are
much more likely to identify as ideologically conservative, while the non-committed have a
greater tendency to identify as ideologically liberal. Therefore, the origin of group partisan
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support is based upon religious commitment and ideology, with religiosity serving as the impetus
for the partisan cleaving of the electorate.
The other significant aspect of the ideological realignment and the cleaving of the
electorate based upon religious commitment is that since commitment and ideology are
significant among all three religious traditions examined, the concept of the decline of
denominationalism, or “old-world” cleavages based upon group identification or ethnicity, also
receives significant support by this research model. Clearly, the new values-based cleavage is
driven by religious commitment and ideology and has begun to obscure the traditional cleavage
of group identity. However, the research model utilized in this thesis also demonstrates that
while denominationalism has dramatically declined, reports of its demise have been exaggerated.
The regression model clearly suggests that those Catholic voters who were part of the preVatican II era and were born before 1940 are still carrying their traditional partisan attachment.
For example, among committed Catholic pre-Vatican II cohorts, generation affiliation actually
outweighed ideology in statistical significance in predicting partisanship. This suggests the
continued existence of group-based divisions within the electorate, the emergence of a new
commitment based division, as well as the static nature of partisan identification.
The ideological realignment, commitment-based cleavage, and the decline, although not
the absence, of denominationalism are also confirmed by the fact that these changes within the
electorate are most prevalent among the youngest age cohort. For example, age cohorts are
statistically significant predictors of partisanship among the religious groups who have
demonstrated the greatest shift in partisan allegiance, committed Catholics and committed
evangelicals, in both time-periods. Much of the evidence presented suggests that Catholic voters,
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as well as voters in general, who have entered the electorate since1980 are more likely than were
their parents to become affiliated with the Republican party. The commitment-based cleaving of
the Catholic electorate which has recently become more pronounced also suggests that “culture
war” politics has permeated, as it has the electorate in general, Catholic voters as well.
Scholars continue to debate whether there is or is not such a thing as the “Catholic vote.”
Clearly, this study has emphasized the diminution of Catholicity as a base of distinction within
the American electorate. Instead, the picture of the Catholic electorate that emerges from this
thesis is one of a cleaved “Catholic vote,” one that is younger, more affluent, and conservative
and another that is older and more liberal. As the traditionally Democratic bloc of pre-Vatican II
age cohorts are inevitably replaced by younger cohorts with Republican tendencies, the latter
group will come to dominate the ranks of Catholic voters within the electorate.
A complex set of forces converge to produce a mosaic of sub-groups that is the “Catholic
vote.” This study attempts to bring us closer to a more thorough comprehension of the patterns of
partisanship among Catholic identifiers within the American electorate. The evidence which has
emerged from this study explains the recent trends in the political behavior of American
Catholics, and provides a framework for understanding the patterns which will transpire in the
elections cycles to come. As the number of pre-Vatican II cohorts continues to dwindle, the
ideological force of social conservatism will continue to propel yonger committed Catholics
toward the Republican party. In addition, the evidence suggests that rising income levels and
conservative economic policy will propel a segment of non-committed Catholics toward the
Republican party as well. Based upon the data presented in this thesis, then, the Democratic party
should continue pursue the traditionally pro-union, pro-Democratic segment of the Catholic
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electorate, along with non-committed and ideologically liberal Catholic identifiers. Conversely,
Republicans should focus on fostering a coalition of fiscally and socially conservative Catholics.
These Catholics are younger and are considered committed to their religion.
There is much work to be done in order to assess the future partisan patterns of American
Catholics. The election of 2004 will provide ample opportunity for additional research on the
question of Catholic partisan identification, as the Democratic nominee for president of the
United States, John F. Kerry, is a Catholic, and is only the third Catholic presidential nominee of
any major political party in American history. With extensive press coverage given to Kerry’s
Communion issues with several American Bishops, continued opposition to abortion and
homosexual marriage from the Vatican, and the Democratic party’s overt support for abortion
and same-sex marriages or “civil-unions,” researchers will have plenty of data to analyze with
regard to Catholic issues and Catholicism in the American electorate as well as its effect upon
Catholic political behavior. The findings which have surfaced in this study, however, reveal a
continued decline in Democratic support from Catholic voters, and a continued secular
realignment which, although lacking an evangelical fervor, will produce, within a decade, a solid
Republican majority among Catholic identifiers within the American electorate.
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